Egyptian business tycoon and the country’s second-richest man, Naguib Sawiris, fired a shot at Ethiopia in his Twitter feed. “We will never allow any country to starve us, if Ethiopia doesn’t come to reason, we the Egyptian people will be the first to call for war,” Mr. Sawiris wrote on Twitter.
We will never allow any country to starve us , if Ethiopia doesn’t come to reason , we the Egyptian people will be the first to call for war #EgyptNiLeRights
The comment came in the midst of trilateral talks on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, which Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources & Irrigation reportedly described as not going well because of Addis Ababa’s “intransigence”.
Naguib Sawiris, chairman and chief executive officer of Orascom Telecom Media And Technology Holding SAE, has become the latest among the list of Egyptian political and business elites who have been threatening to go to war to secure continued access to the Nile waters. This is a far cry for a man who came to Ethiopia two years ago with the intention to invest in the country and posted a picture of himself with the Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed.
Thousands of years of culture, history, religion, and most importantly the Nile waters have created strong bonds amongst the peoples of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. It should be clear that no wicked force in the world can break these people to people cultural ties, fraternities, and interactions. A negotiation that reflects the above spirits and the needs and the rights of people to flourish within the boundaries of their countries and or regionally as their aspirations should be encouraged. Most importantly, however, science-driven and evidence-based negotiated settlements are key. Most observers and followers of the discussions also recognize the tripartite negotiation between the three countries on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dam is a result of gradual trust and confidence-building measures cultivated through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
The NBI is a breakthrough and comprehensive transitional mechanism of Nile riparian countries that brokered the basin to move towards shared rights on water resources. This was the first collective understanding of Nile colonial water arrangements that were obsolete, just as colonialism is. The NBI is also indicative that it is not in the best interest of Africa and the Nile basin states to shy away from the “shared vision of the basin, i.e. “achieving sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.”
Unfortunately, the recent negotiation on the GERD lacks the traction of shared responsibility, spirit of equitable utilization and most of all, basin fraternity. And the issue of drought management is the most important one.
The 1970s and the 1980s Ethiopian droughts
The 1970s and 1980s prolonged drought disaster and its consequences are fresh in the memory of humankind. Who will forget the skinny Ethiopian boys and girls, who will forget, the hundreds of thousands of people, who perished due to lack of food and water? There were millions of people who trekked to all parts of the country and the world. No one forgets the “We are the world” project organized to mobilize aid for millions of dying Ethiopians children.
Ethiopian children of the drought period still live in different parts of the world, traumatized, not to hear the shocks and the aftermath of their childhood memory. Drought in Ethiopia is ferocious mainly because it manifests in all its forms – meteorological, agricultural, hydrological and socioeconomic-economic drought.
When drought strikes Ethiopia, it deprives of water supply to the community, it destroys agricultural crops and it affects both the macro and local economics. It throws the country into power rationing reducing economic outputs and basic household electricity, curtails crop production interfering in the macroeconomic of the country as more than 80% of the country is largely rain-fed. Despite the apparent abundance of rainfall in Ethiopia, it is a well-established science it is both erratic and rushes to the rivers due to the rugged, eroded, and mountainous terrain. It gives little time for the water to infiltrate into the soil and remain as residual moisture for sufficient time. As few as ten days, rainfall deficit in the middle of the wet season significantly reduces the crop yield or crops totally wilt let alone annual or prolonged drought in the country. Consequently, even under normal rainfall year, as much as 5 million or more Ethiopians are chronically food insecure, electricity is rationed and wells could be dry. This is a clear rationale that Ethiopia cannot feed itself without small and large-scale irrigation using its share of water from the Nile. It should be known that more than 85 % of Ethiopia’s water flows into the Nile.
A general view of the Blue Nile river as it passes through the GERD, near Guba in Ethiopia. (Photo by EDUARDO SOTERAS / AFP)
Drought and GERD negotiation
The GERD for Ethiopia is the hope and renaissance from its deep-rooted drought trauma and its stigma. Since the start of construction in 1911, the three countries of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are in advanced stages of negotiation on the filling and operation of the GERD dam. The concerns of the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan due to GERD filling and operation are rational and should be appreciated by Ethiopians and resolved in a cooperative and shared approach. It is also important to recognize once GERD is a fact on the ground, the risks posed by drought should be a business of the three countries not only Ethiopia.
It is not only sad to hear Ethiopia is asked to shoulder the brunt of the hydrological drought all in its own; but it is even crueler when such an assertion comes from the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan, countries that are fully aware of the problems Ethiopia faces due to the drought. It should be known Egypt and Sudan have many reservoirs that can absorb the impact of GERD filling or even more than a year of drought. So demanding Ethiopia to shoulder the hydrological droughts alone is like demanding a farmer to repay his debt after drought imposed crop failure.
The whole world recognizes that when drought strikes in Ethiopia it strikes in its entirety. All the manifestation of the meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, and the social-economic droughts cripple the country. As usual, Ethiopia will continue to face the brunt of the other three droughts but it is in the best interest of all the three countries to manage the hydrological droughts (the drought manifested in the Blue Nile Rivers) jointly by the three countries. In the negotiation, shared responsibility and accountability of the three countries need to be articulated clearly and shown in the final document.
It is not in the best interest of the people of the three countries to corner Ethiopia (85% Nile water contributor) to shoulder the drought mitigation at GERD alone.If a conflict arises on shared water, river flows may not be the same as before. Negotiated and peaceful water-sharing benefits everyone.
Recommendation
There is an utter lack of spirit of collaboration, principle of shared responsibility, and sincere recognition of Ethiopia’s right to utilize the Blue Nile resources as a contributor of more than 85% of the water to the Nile. This recognition opens up a new gate to collaboration and collegiality in the entire basin. Egypt and Sudan can demonstrate this by signing the basin-wide Cooperative framework Agreement (CFA), which gives a legal basis for permanent agreements that is administered by an independent commission like any other basin countries in Africa, like the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) water-sharing agreements region)
In the case of ongoing GERD negotiation, discussion on the annual drought thresholds is a futile attempt to protect the de facto ‘historical water rights’ at any cost. In principle, annual droughts are easily manageable in both Egypt and Sudan and shouldn’t be as such a sticking point. However, they can introduce a concept of severe drought that is less than 30 BCM. Under such circumstances, the three countries enter into a joint emergency mitigation plan. Beyond and above the 30 BCM thresholds, the annual droughts can be managed by each country given transparent and proper communication from Ethiopia as to the extent of the drought.
In the case of prolonged droughts (as the term may be agreed by negotiation), the three countries should fully take the shared responsibility of such drought and step up efforts to mitigate jointly. Once, it is identified as prolonged drought, the three countries need to invoke and establish an emergency plan known as “Drought Response Operation Plan (DROP)”. This is a well-known mechanism that can function well. The basis of mitigation should be the severity of the impact on each country. In the event of CFA is signed and the countries step out of the shadow of a bilateral agreement, the Nile basin-wide institutional mechanism may step in to undertake the emergency plans.
The fact that Ethiopia has an undeniable right to benefit from its rivers for irrigation and power generation shall be accepted for any longstanding water agreement.
The three countries of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan need to show their resolution to conclude the filling phase of the GERD. As recommended recently, the three countries may enter into a binding agreement as far as the filling is concerned. The negotiation on operation aspects of GERD can be continued as the interim agreement on filling is concluded. It is not advisable to rush the operation aspects of the dam under such a short period of time.
It is not in the interest of any of Egypt or Sudan to continue putting fire on the wounds of Ethiopians by demanding to shoulder the hydrological drought solely on Ethiopia while Ethiopia carries the brunt of complex drought manifestations as mentioned above. The way out of such a not-going-anywhere negotiation is to fully implement integrated Nile basin development and management under the auspices of Nile basin authority.
Main Image: Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, right, shakes hands with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in Cairo on June 10, 2018.
Let me start with three stories from Ethiopia before I go into the politics of GMOs in Africa.
In 2013, I participated in a workshop at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR). From the introductions, I could see that over 90% of participants were either students of modern biotechnology or involved in one way or another in its development and spread, including representatives from the US Embassy and USAID. The main debate was about which part of the 2009 Biosafety Regulation to change to allow confined field trials of Bt Cotton and the importation of patented genetic materials for laboratory experiments. The regulation was considered too restrictive and needing change. From civil society, Gebremedhin Birega, Ayele Kebede, and I were participating. All of the presentations were about how GMOs are a must to feed us and to have enough cotton for our textile factories. When there was a break, I was in line for coffee behind a man whom I knew very well from the university. To my question about the meeting, I remember him saying, “We have to change this law, Million. Monsanto has refused to come to Ethiopia and to give us its patented germ cell for laboratory use if the law is not changed.” I just froze and didn’t say anything. An Ethiopian national fighting to change our law for Monsanto to come in? I couldn’t believe my ears and wouldn’t have believed it if someone had told me. Later on, I learned that he did his PhD on modern biotechnology.
The second story is about a meeting in 2014 to validate the COMESA Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy Implementation Plan, designed to harmonize biotech regulation across all 19 countries in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. In the afternoon, the discussion was on risk analysis of GE technology. The then Head of the Ethiopian Biotechnology Research Institute came and sat a chair away from me. Within five minutes of his arrival, he raised his hand and was immediately given the floor. He said, “I think testing of GMO crops is done in the USA under the auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Therefore, there is no need for us to do risk analysis here in Africa. We might as well get the seeds and plant them.” Again I could not believe my ears. How could someone from a research centre in Ethiopia say that, when US and Africa have different terrains, and when he knows that the soil in Ethiopia changes every kilometre?
The third story comes from the Ethiopian Parliament in 2014. I had phoned a friend, the head of one of the key institutions in Ethiopia, who told me that he was in a meeting organized by the Ethiopian Science Academy with funding from USAID. They were strategizing on how to influence the revision of the 2009 Ethiopian Biosafety Proclamation. Ethiopian conservationists told me that there would be a debate at the Parliament on the new Proclamation and asked me to participate. Weeks earlier, I had invited key knowledgeable actors including Solomon Kebede, head of Movement for Ecological Learning and Community Action (MELCA – Ethiopia), and we had criticized the newly suggested proclamation line by line and had submitted our critique to the Standing Committee for Environment of the Ethiopian Parliament. I called Gebremedhin, and we agreed to go and defend the document we had submitted. We arrived early and watched as more than 20 high-level scientists descended on the Parliament, very well briefed and organized. The scientists introduced themselves to the Parliament; none of them had any semblance of connection with biosafety law or regulation, nor had they all participated in the debate related to the Proclamation before. It was clear that they were paraded to impress the Parliament with their credentials, and to push for a change of the Proclamation. In 2015, the GMO proponents succeeded in weakening the Ethiopian Biosafety Proclamation and the institutional resistance to GMOs.
Ethiopian parliament Amended GMO Law on May 2015 photo Addis Fortune
The big question is: What then were the key strategies (or ways) that GMO proponents were putting into practice behind the scenes in my stories? How could they turn the tide of resistance against GMOs, from institutions and academia, to get their way?
I found a good part of the answer in a paper written by Matthew A. Schnurr. Exploring the case of Uganda, he identifies three strategies by which corporate actors, aid agencies, philanthrocapitalists, policy officials, and research scientists influence the acceptance of GMOs and change regulations in Africa.
The first is material/real power. Real power speaks about a donor-driven agenda to influence structures in the government. The influence starts with training key individuals, mostly promising African scientists, in modern biotechnology at universities in the North. These key individuals will be placed, through lobbying and connections, in key government institutions and positions, to act as intellectuals for the biotech bloc. Real power exerts pressure to shift regulatory regimes to support biotechnology. Since most country biosafety processes are slow and their capacity for producing the regulation is low, they will push for sub-regional harmonization of biosafety laws to circumvent restrictions at national regulations. This is where my second story above fits.
US agroindustry and multinational repressentaives on visit in Ethiopia, May 17, 2019.
The second strategy is what they call institutional power. This is a strategy to use both formal and informal means to exert pressure on institutions. Detailed mapping and ranking of key individuals and institutions will be done. There will be support for structural development, including the building of biotechnology research centers, and supporting more students to study abroad. Through a series of lunch meetings, organized visits, and trips abroad, the targeted institutions will be pushed to change their resistance against GMOs. They have also created key institutions to facilitate acceptance.
The third strategy is what they call influencing the narrative. They target key government offices and bombard them with flowery information regarding the technology. They organize field visits for combined groups of journalists and government officials. They also target public opinion, writing Op-Eds in national media, and organizing training for journalists, often with hefty per diems, and encourage them to write and talk about how GMOs are a must to increase production and feed the people. They take promising journalists to Cornell University in the US and get them trained in the mainly Bill Gates and USAID supported organization called Cornell Alliance for Science. They court science writers and editors in the media and influence them to write about the technology.
A video showing a USAID-sponsored tour to India bringing Ethiopian policymakers, journalists, and farmers. Abu Tefera, an agricultural specialist of the USDA, and others are seen speaking of the virtues of GM crops introduced in India by Monsanto.
I am convinced they have used this combination of strategies in Ethiopia, and suspect that they have used them in other countries.
The CSOs in Africa do not have the financial or political clout that these funding institutions and newly-minted networks have. This enormous economic influence has narrowed our political space, turned Africans against each other, and arm-twisted our governments to support a technology that they least understand and are deeply suspicious about.
We need to use our research, and that of others, to provide evidence that agroecology is a solution. We need to educate the public about the myths that are thrown around by the GMO proponents. We need to strategize how to reach our decision-makers and advocate for rejecting GMOs. Finally, we need to strengthen and unite the social movement to confront the push effectively. That is the only instrument that we have, and we have to use it properly.
Main Image: Ethiopia parliamentarians visitingcotton farm in India.
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The government of Ethiopia under the Premiership of Abiy Ahmed has recorded outstanding achievements and faced multiple political challenges. One of the most memorable political events that occurred under Abiy Ahmed’s premiership is the conceding of statehood to the people of Sidama Zone in 2019, in response to a decades-long sustained struggle.
The granting of statehood to Sidama Zone has opened a Pandora’s box of political conundrums and a potential for instability in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR). As Hawassa city, which has been the administrative capital of the SNNPR, becomes the administrative capital of Sidama State, other Zones are in the process of determining a new administrative capital. This process has a disproportionate impact on the South Omo Zone, which is located in the southern periphery of the SNNPR.
Due to a combination of historical, socio-political, economic, and cultural reasons, the people of South Omo have continually demanded statehood for some time now. The government of Ethiopia, in a typical fashion, has delayed tackling the question through condescending political discussions. If the federal government does not address the demand for statehood from one of the most peaceful zones in the whole country, the consequences may be far greater than one might imagine. There will be a sense of marginalization, lack of belongingness and possibly sustained protests and violence all of which are inimical to economic development and prosperity.
B. Five Reasons in Support of South Omo’s Statehood
Today it appears that reasoned political discourse has no place in the current political environment of Ethiopia. Legitimate pleas for a better and more efficient governance structure are conveniently branded as ethno-nationalism. For three decades, under the government of Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), run by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), demanding statehood was labelled as an attempt to disintegrate the country. Now, this political strategy of misbranding, aimed at suppressing legitimate popular demand is still prevalent among political elites who over-zealously want to create a large government wherever it is possible. They ignore historical, socio-economic, cultural and local political contexts to achieve their ambition of big, corrupt and inefficient government structures. The time has come to reject such anachronistic political strategy and to examine alternative political ideas with reasonable and civil discourse.
In that spirit, this short memorandum invites the federal government to closely examine South Omo Zone’s demand for statehood rather than arrogantly dismissing it. The zone’s plea for statehood is a measured and appropriate response to an unjust political system and decades of marginalization. It is aimed at creating a more stable and sustainable self-administration. The memorandum provides five key reasons why South Omo Zone’s demand for statehood warrants an affirmative response from the federal government.
Market at Weyto, Lower Omo Valley
Historically, South Omo has been a State
South Omo was directly accountable to the central government from 1891 to 1937 E.C. From 1938 to 1979 E.C, it was under the administration of Gamo Gofa Region (Kifle Hager). After the establishment of the Southern Region in 1980 E.C, it was renamed Region 10 (Kilil 10), when it resumed its status as a regional state. Subsequent to the 1984 regional council election, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) was formed with the merger of Regions 7-11(Kilil 7-11) including South Omo (Kilil 10).
The historical evidence suggests that South Omo witnessed stronger economic development and prosperity when it enjoyed the status of state. On the contrary, it witnessed significant economic disadvantages and marginalization under the SNNPR. The people of South Omo should not be denied their historical right to self-administration recognized by the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. According to Article 47(3), any Ethiopian Nation, Nationality or People has the right to form its own state. This right of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of South Omo that has existed throughout history and is recognized by the constitution should be restored to them.
Unproductive Cycles of State Restructuring
When South Omo Zone became a part of Gamo Gofa Region, its people made significant contributions to the development of the city of Arbaminch and its surrounding areas. Subsequent to the restructuring, which made South Omo part of SNNPR, South Omo integrated with SSNPR, yet its investment of resources into the development of Arbaminch have not been recognized.
Over the past several decades, the people of South Omo have similarly contributed massively to the development and prosperity of Hawassa. Hawassa, as the administrative capital of SNNPR, has for decades been a symbol of hope and unity for the people of South Omo. Subsequent to the granting of statehood to Sidama Zone, South Omo is once again on the verge of losing its hope and access to invaluable infrastructure in which it has invested for decades.
During these cycles of state restructuring, Jinka, the administrative capital of South Omo, has suffered from severe economic disadvantages as resources were directed to building the capacity of the regional capitals. Universities, technical training institutions, regional government offices, private investments, were all concentrated in those cities.
South Omo should no longer be required to endure this cycle of unproductive state restructuring that unfairly consumes its resources while undermining the people’s historical and constitutional right to self governance and economic prosperity.
Pastoralists in South Omo region.
Lack of Strong Cultural Ties with the Rest of Nations and Nationalities in the Region
The various ethnicities in South Omo Zone do not share linguistic and cultural similarities with Gamo Gofa, Konso and other ethnicities in the Sothern region. They also do not share common cultural heritage and psychological makeup with these neighboring nations and nationalities. In terms of economic development, South Omo is one of the Zones that still lags behind. The people of South Omo legitimately believe that it is unfair to organize people with significant differences in language, culture, psychological makeup, and economic development under the same state structure. The current state structure will perpetuate the existing gap in the distribution of infrastructure and overall economic development and perpetuate South Omo’s slow economic development.
Robust Capacity to Self-Administer
South Omo Zone is endowed with natural resources including minerals, agricultural and grazing lands, water resources, forests, national parks, fisheries, and a young labor force. The Zone is also one of the top tourist destinations in the country. The efficient and sustainable utilization of these resources for local and national development and prosperity requires a strong state of self-governing nations, nationalities, and peoples. The granting of statehood to South Omo would ensure that a relatively smaller regional government mobilizes these resources without mismanagement and maladministration. South Omo zone is well situated to be a state in terms of population size (estimated to be over 1 Million People), natural resources, a strong sense of patriotism and Ethiopianism, history of longstanding peaceful co-existence of various ethnicities and commitment to local and national development.
5. Unfair Distribution of Infrasture and Public Services
In South Omo Zone, youth unemployment is increasing at an alarming rate due to the lack of specialized training institutions for youth who drop out of school or who are unable to attend universities and thus seek vocational training. This has created a gap in employability where new job posts are filled by youths coming from other regions while those born and raised in South Omo are considered unqualified and remain unemployed. In addition to the above challenges, the zone has generally poor infrastructure and public services including electricity, road, health services, financial services, roads and many other essential services. The granting of statehood to South Omo would create an opportunity to invest in various infrastructure and youth employment programs.
C. A Call for More Transparent and All-inclusive Dialogue South Omo peoples’ demand for statehood should not be easily dismissed. The question is raised by the younger generation. It will define the future of politics in the Southern region. It is a justifiable demand, not only from the perspective of the right to self-administration but also from the standpoint of efficient administration of natural resources, good governance and democracy. It is proven in other countries that smaller governments manage their resources better fight against corruption more effectively and deliver public services, including responding to epidemics, more quickly and effectively.
South Omo Zone can be considered one of the most peaceful zones in Ethiopia where different ethnic groups co-exist. It has also had a long- standing friendly relationship with neighboring zones. The Zone will continue to represent modern Ethiopia for centuries to come. It will continue to demonstrate the strength that lies in diversity in its quintessential form. However, all of these will happen only if its nations, nationalities, and peoples are given back their historical and constitutional right to self-governance and prosperity. South Omo must regain its statehood for the good of its people and the people of Ethiopia and it should regain it now.
If the government continues to treat the people with condescension and engage in opaque behind-closed-door dialogues with selected individuals, it will be a consequential mistake that the government would regret in the future. True democracy, sustainable development, and prosperity cannot be achieved by arbitrary decision-making in government structure and over-centralized government.
Main image: Jinka town, the capital of the Debub Omo Zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region.
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As the trilateral talks on a treaty regulating the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) continue to witness occasional episodes of optimism and frustration, the last six months also featured unprecedented levels of frenzy and internationalization of an otherwise ‘bilateral dispute’ – for the first time involving not just Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, but also international powers and players.
This premeditated move represents a fundamental shift in Egypt’s strategy – and is obstructive to say the least. It is prompted by Egypt’s desperation that its exertions in the tripartite forums have not been able to sway decisions along its own liking – while Ethiopia moves forward with the construction of the dam and readies for its partial filling and operation in a few weeks. What a better way to make-up for a diplomatic predicament than to cry out accusations of foul-play – in the hope of generating undeserved sympathy from the international community.
In October 2019, trilateral negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt had once again stalled. This forced Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to ‘call on the international community to shoulder its responsibility in finding a solution that satisfies all parties’. Shortly afterward, the White House Press Secretary issued a veryrare statement in which the United States articulated the Administration’s position that ‘all Nile Valley countries have a right to economic development and prosperity’ and that the US supports ongoing negotiations between all to reach ‘cooperative, sustainable and mutually beneficial agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD’.
Against the background of escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt – but more importantly, working on its increasing orientation to involve outside help in the Nile dam conversation, the month of October also saw the US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin inviting the foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to Washington DC to discuss operational rules of the GERD.
Ethiopia, who had consistently opposed to all such moves in the past – because of what it ‘represents’ than ‘actually does’, accepted this invitation very reluctantly – mainly in deference to the historic relationship with the US. The meeting, attended by US President Donald Trump and President of the World Bank Group David Malpass, took place in early November – with the countries agreeing to hold four rounds of meetings, including two in the US, and working towards reaching a definitive agreement by January 15, 2020.
US president with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, as well as the president of the World Bank Group, David Malpass, in Washingto on November 2019 for a discussion about a hydropower dam project on the Nile River
Again, the GERD was a talking point on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October; in November, a wholly unanticipated deputation was also showcased by Mishaal bin Fahm Al-Salami, President of the Arab Parliament, expressing the Arab Parliament’s solidarity with Egypt and Sudan in the defense of their water security.
To this is added the Arab League Council’s visionless and unprincipled resolution issued in Cairo in March of this year; the Council toiled to the tell the world that ‘the water security of Egypt is an integral part of the Arab national security’ and that it rejects ‘any unilateral measures that might be taken by Ethiopia, including starting filling the GERD reservoir, without reaching a comprehensive agreement’. Egypt’s first submission made with the UN Security Council – and its continued predisposition today to ditch trilateralism and instead focus on UN platforms – is the culmination of this process.
Reduced to its essentials, Egypt’s frantic enterprise in all fronts – pursued under the guise of the ‘need for reaching agreement on rules of filling and operation of the dam before it becomes operational’ – has only one sinister objective: to craft a global misperception, deflect focus of ongoing technical negotiations – and amid such muddle – clutch Ethiopia’s legally binding assurance that shields Egypt’s so-called ‘natural and historical shares’ to Nile waters.
Nowhere else is this alarming fixation with ‘historical rights’ evident than in Egypt’s audacious proposition in current negotiations – demanding that Ethiopia guarantee the release, after the first stage of filling, of up to 40 billion cubic meters of Blue Nile waters annually – as opposed to Ethiopia’s general disposition to discharge up to 31 billion cubic meters of water downstream (without ipso facto establishing allocations regime). And this Egyptian proposal being presented when the Blue Nile River system yieldsonly a mean flow of 49.5 billion cubic meters annually? What are we not getting, really?
Given the confusions that thrive, it is only imperative to once again converse on fundamentals of international watercourses law – and demonstrate the manifestly unfounded and egocentric nature of the arguments on which Egypt’s ‘defense’ of water rights is predicated.
Get it right and get it soon: there is no such a thing called ‘historical right’
Between 1882-1951, an unremitting British imperial river politics had not only humbled Ethiopia’s standing over time, it also entrenched an extreme nationalist conviction in Egypt which brandished the Nile as the ‘exclusive property of Egypt’. In ostensiblylegal idiom, the ‘natural’ and ‘historical’ rights expressions constituted the central pillars of downstream claims.
In truth, neither international law – as evidenced by the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) nor the treaty practice of states has ever recognized a right based on ‘historical’ claims or ‘natural’ right notions. Quite to the contrary, any reference to the protection of ‘historical rights’ is completely rejected – as this is manifestly inconsistent with the ‘sovereign equality’ and ‘equitable right’ of each state to utilize a water system lying within its jurisdiction.
To the extent that ‘pre-existing uses’ are juxtaposed with ‘historical rights’, the Watercourses Convention has unequivocally denied it of any singular preeminence; a prior use constitutes only one of the seven broad set of factors and circumstances that would be taken into consideration to determine each riparian state’s equitable share in the beneficial use of shared waters.
It follows that Egypt’s vigorous espousal of ‘rights’ based on such premise – purposefully intensified to generate sympathy in the context of the GERD, is nothing but posturing one’s defense on a losing ground.
The 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Treaties have no bearing whatsoever on Ethiopia
The treaties concluded in 1929 (between the semi-autonomous government of Egypt and Great Britain – representing the colonies of Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) and in 1959 (between Egypt and Sudan), had formally sanctioned the use and allocation of the Nile waters just between the parties involved. The technical presentation annexed to the 1929 treaty had been construed as allotting Sudan and Egypt respectively four and 48 billion cubic meters of the Nile waters annually.
The 1959 treaty declared as ‘acquired rights’ the shares of the two republics outlined under the 1929 agreement – with full operation of the Aswan High Dam bestowing on Sudan and Egypt 18.5 and 55.5 billion cubic meters of waters each year – which, basically, is equivalent to thewhole of theriver’s mean annual flow.
What the two Nile treaties promised to secure in a purely bilateral context has no bearing whatsoever on Ethiopia’s sovereign right of utilizing its natural resources – both generally and in relation to GERD’s filling and operation. The treaties impact only such states-parties involved in their making, and arguably, dependencies on whose behalf Great Britain had undertaken a duty of ‘non-interference’.
Ethiopia was engaged, neither directly nor through a proxy, as a party to the foretasted arrangements. A fundamental proposition of customary international law, restated under Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), clearly prescribes that a treaty cannot create obligations for a third state without its written consent.
Equitable utilization, not the duty not cause significant harm, represents the domineering rule
Ethiopia recognizes the ‘right to equitable utilization’ and ‘the duty not to cause significant harm’ principles as cornerstones of international watercourses law. This has always been the basis on which Ethiopia has pursued its involvements in the Nile Basin Initiative and GERD negotiations.
However, as a matter of correct interpretation of international law, Ethiopia views that the no significant harm rule cannot and shall not be read as entailing a prohibition or as in any way requiring prior permission from Egypt before it can embark on the development of its water resources.
Consistent with the positions advocated by the UN International Law Commission itself as well as a chain of highly reputed international law publicists, the principle under Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention, prescribing a duty not cause significant harm, only limits late-coming countries such as Ethiopia from causing ‘harm that exceeds a certain threshold’, which itself is set within the context of a process of equitable use determination. In other words, Ethiopia’s utilization of the Nile waters at any time implicates its ‘international responsibility’ only when such utilization ‘exceeds its right to equitable entitlement’.
In consequence, Egypt’s juridical fervor which advocates that the no-harm rule operates to proscribe Ethiopia notwithstanding, any ‘factual harm’ inflicted by GERD within the limits of Ethiopia’s exercise of equitable and reasonable utilization will not be regarded as infringing the rights of Egypt.
It must be profusely clear that as a matter of international law, what is prohibited is conduct by which one state exceeds its equitable share, or deprives another state of its equitable share of the uses of the watercourse. Put differently, the focus should be on the duty not to cause legal injury (by making a non-equitable use), rather than on the duty not to cause a factual harm.
As Ethiopia advances in GERD Project, its obligation in relation to Egypt’s water rights shall only be viewed in this perspective and as entailing nothing more.
No rule of international law requires that riparian countries commit to an agreement before they can make use of a transboundary river
As the trilateral discourse hauled endlessly – when Ethiopia also affirmed its conviction to proceed with filling of the dam this rainy season, a critical question has come to the fore – to which journalists, political activists, analysts, politicians, and academicians had reacted quite differently: as a matter of international law, can Ethiopia fill the GERD without an agreement signed with downstream riparian countries? The answer is very simple and straight forward: yes it can. Part of the explanation is offered above – that any unilateral initiative by a riparian is legitimate so long as it doesn’t trespass its equitable entitlement.
This cardinal principle was seminally established in actual setting in the arbitration of the international court in the Lake Lanoux case between France v. Spain (1957) in which Spain tabled France literally the same request Egypt and Sudan are now asking Ethiopia: that France’s ‘works could not be undertaken without the previous agreement of France and Spain’; France maintained that ‘it could legally proceed without such agreement’.
In unequivocally rejecting the Spanish line of contention, the tribunal held that such request ‘amounts to admitting a right of assent, a right of veto, which at the discretion of one state paralyses the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of another’.
This was precisely the position that was advocated by the International Law Commission when it finalized drafting the UN Watercourses Convention in 1994 in which it submitted: ‘watercourse States are not under obligation to conclude an agreement before using the waters of the international watercourse; to require conclusion of an agreement as a pre-condition of use would be to afford watercourse States the power to veto a use by other watercourse States of the waters of international watercourse by simply refusing to reach agreement’. This statement tells a lot and can serve as demonstration that Egypt’s legal arguments are fundamentally flawed.
This is not to also mention that there is nothing in the Declaration of Principles (2015) signed between the three countries which implies any such reading.
Genuine cooperation, not politicization, promotes the sovereign interest of Egypt and Sudan
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) – the first truly comprehensive cooperative enterprise on the Nile river since 1999 – and the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA: 2010) – were devised after years of hard labor and diplomacy to do justice to the utterly inequitable patterns of use of the Nile waters. In spite of the painstaking efforts, the NBI failed to attain its core objective, i.e., the ratification of an inclusive treaty and the establishment of the Nile River Basin Commission. The process foundered because of Egypt’s unrelenting procrastination and insistence to safeguard pre-existing uses and colonial-epoch treaties.
Similarly, the stalemates encountered over the last few years and the sluggish progresses in negotiations on the GERD since its announcement in 2011 are attributed to the hard-nose postures, distractions and foul-play cries exhibited by Egypt. Any yet, Egypt had consistently endeavored to shift the blames to Ethiopia and continues to engage in diversion strategies.
In the absence of positive actions from Egypt and a continuous impasse being created in relation to the GERD, Ethiopia should have no option but to focus on the single preoccupation that matters – the unilateral development of the Nile resources within its jurisdiction – based on the doctrine of equitable uses. The ball is and has always been on the Egyptian field to demonstrate diplomatic dexterity and deliver today a serious compromise; Egypt needs to stop engaging in distortion, side-stepping, attention-seeking – and refrain from involving in a conflicting strategic course of the classical zero-sum game theory where one’s gain entails the absolute loss of the other.
In this photo provided by Egypt’s state news agency MENA, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, third left, meets with his counterpart Workneh Gebeyehu, third right, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tuesday, Dec. 26, 2017. (MENA via AP)
Ethiopia will defend its sovereign rights by all means
For centuries, a forbidding dearth in policy, fiscal facility and technical competence had inhibited any meaningful development of the Nile waters in Ethiopia. For the most part of the 20th century, Ethiopia’s policy course was one of reaction to specific downstream maneuvers – than actions. No more stalking! Ethiopia shall organize comprehensive strategies for equitable utilization of the Nile water resources, including the GERD, and for proper defense of its water use rights under international law.
Both in the context of the GERD – and broadly in relation to the Blue Nile waters, Ethiopia shall not submit to any pressures, direct or indirect, or to Egypt’s rhetoric of war. Egypt’s unconstructive, old-fashioned and belligerent threats are utterly misplaced – not that Ethiopia would succumb to any such eccentricities anyway. Needless to restate the obvious – and lessons should be drawn by the wise – that in Ethiopia’s long-tracked and proud political history, no foreign belligerent tinkering with its sovereignty had ever survived the day to tell the story.
Let’s be candid; the long-term and sustainable interests of Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the Nile would be served only through cooperation – not a cut-rate hydro-politics, through mutual trust – not by crying out foul-play, through equitable use – not by masquerading antiquated debates of historical entitlement. The choices we make today define our destiny over the collectively owned resource.
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A rare “ring of fire” solar eclipse was visible at several locations in Ethiopia on Sunday.
The eclipse was observed from various parts of western and northern Ethiopia including Wellega, Bahir Dar, Injibara, Lalibela, Alamata, and Afar.
According to astronomers, an annular eclipse occurs when the Moon’s distance is near its limit for the umbra to reach Earth, meaning that it will not completely block out the Sun.
In the northern Ethiopian town of Lalibela, people gathered to watch the event using protective glasses supplied by the nonprofit group Astronomers Without Borders.
Here are some stunning photos of the eclipse that took place on Sunday, taken by Nahom Tesfaye.
The death of a 60-year-old man in Dire Dawa Dil Chora Referral Hospital on June 17 has left many hospital staff in a state of fear. The patient was first admitted to the hospital after exhibiting headaches and chest infection, according to a primary care physician. “Then came a fever and a dry cough. A few days later, the oxygen saturation level dropped,” the physician says. He did the test for COVID -19 and the test came back positive ten days after his hospitalization, and he passed away a day later. After word spread in the hospital, staff who were looking after the deceased and other patients who shared a room with him were seized with apprehension. The physician who worked in emergency rooms said that they were worried more so because the management of the hospital had not taken the initiative to test the staff who were at risk and accordingly place them into quarantine. “It was like nothing had happened. They didn’t say anything. The hospital was not closed for cleaning.” Certain of the doctors had thus to take the initiative to give their samples for testing, he said. (All of them have since tested negative.)
From cleaning staff to doctors and nurses, hospital workers report exasperating failures by management to notify them of potential exposure to patients known to be infected with COVID-19 or co-workers. Those working in institutions not dedicated to Covid-19 patients say that the nature of the job made keeping a distance from patients difficult. In the case of Dire Dawa, doctors at Dil Chora say the regional government is directing its focus towards Sabian Hospital, a center dedicated to treating the virus.
State Minister of Health, Dereje Duguma along with Dire Dawa Administrative Regional Health Bureau head Lemlem Bezabih visiting the Sabian COVID center
The outbursts of Ethiopian doctors against the unpreparedness of the health system in the face of the Covid-19 epidemic and the risks they run at the hospitals are being increasingly voiced on state and private media since May. They took on an alarmist tone when the official case tally began to rise sharply this month. With 75 fatalities and nearly 4, 848 cases of contamination as of June 23, according to official figures, the country is still relatively spared compared with the U.S and Europe, but it now records hundreds of infections every day, including the record high cases of 399 on 20 June. Officials say there is significant community transmission of the virus in the country and the geographical spread is increasing, reaching new areas in the rural part of the country. According to some estimates, a total of 200 health workers in the country have tested positive for the coronavirus.
Hospitals across the country say they are running out of the masks, gowns, protective suits, goggles, and sanitizer that they need to protect staff against the coronavirus. With a shortage of personal protective equipment and testing and delays in tests, many health officers feel they are abandoned and left to their own devices.
Health workers from Dire Dawa and Somlai regions in discussion with State Minister of Health, Dereje Duguma
The government says it is following up to provide the best possible care and sending supplies like masks, gloves and surgical gowns from the donations by China’s Jack Ma Foundation to hospitals in need. “In the past 100 days, 17, 435 treatment and isolation beds were prepared and more than 4500 additional health workers were hired and 12,000 volunteers mobilized,” Director of Public Relations &Communication of Ministry of Health, Tegegne Regassa said in a press briefing on Tuesday. 513 million birr worth personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical equipment were distributed throughout the country, he added. But some medical professions say it fell far short of what was needed. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in its latest report wrote that inadequately equipped quarantine centers and distant test labs remain obstacles in the COVID-19 coordination and response. “Some quarantine centers have been reported to lack access to water, food, PPE and electricity. COVID-19-related awareness raising, and capacity building have also been limited. With the rapid increase in confirmed cases, health facilities are reportedly overstretched, while quarantine centers are full or nearing their full capacity,” the report reads.
The safety protocols for those hospitals dedicated to COVID are better but at other regular hospitals and emergency rooms, the situation is worrying. Dr. Chernet Tegegn from Yekatit 12 Hospital in Addis Ababa complained in an interview with the state-owned Addis Zemen how health workers are being rendered vulnerable to Covid-19 and a lack of vital equipment is becoming their real concern. He lamented how most physicians are treating both regular as well as COVID-19 patients unprotected. Doctors at Tikur Anbesa have also recently told parliamentarians that they are receiving less attention from the government, preventing them from delivering healthcare services to patients.
Ministry of Health officials have been conducting a meeting and dialogue with health care workers in different parts of the country. In a recent meeting led by state minister of health, Dereje Duguma in Dire Dawa, promises were made with regards to PPE and reserving quarantine facilities units to health care workers. To complaints of bosses asking doctors and nurses to work without PPE when treating patients, the Communication Director of the Ministry said that is not right and it should be corrected.
With the number of confirmed cases growing by the day, a continued quarantine response would quickly leave the health care system short-staffed and overwhelmed. The situation has prompted the government to amend the state of emergency regulations, including shortening a mandatory 14-day quarantine of arrivals from abroad. “Individuals suspected for COVID-19 or who tested positive with mild or no symptoms will be asked to self isolate at home if they have the resources, the support, are willing and fulfill the criteria,” Minister of Health Lia Tadesse announced on Friday.
The Dewele quarantine center, situated on the Djibouti border has been closed after the Ethiopian government acknowledged that basic facilities and hygiene did not meet the standards. Thousands of Ethiopians who recently returned from Djibouti — the tiny country hard-hit by the pandemic — were quarantined at a former train station in the town of Dewele.
Dr. Tsegereda Kifle, Deputy Director-General of the Ethiopia Public Health Institute said that the government decided to close “the unsanitary and ill-equipped” quarantine institution in view of the substandard care the facility offered. “As many people kept on arriving crossing the border, the center became too crowded, hosting as many as 700 people in one hall, with male and female together. It lacked basic necessities such as toilet facilities. In one hall, there were 425 people and it was discovered that 97 of them tested positive for COVID-19,” she said.
The facility was closed after the remaining 1050 individuals have been discharged and others transferred to the Dire Dawa University and the Federal Custom quarantine centers, Dr. Tsegereda told DW Amharic. 130 of them who were diagnosed with the virus were admitted to a COVID-center in Dire Dawa city, Dr. Tsegereda was quoted as saying.
So far, the government has managed to set up 54 quarantine facilities in Addis Ababa and the regions but as the number of returnees from neighboring and mid-east countries keeps increasing, the quarantine centers are packed, officials say. “Over 13,400 returnee migrants have completed their 14-day mandatory quarantine in the 54 quarantine facilities across Ethiopia and went home. Over 4,700 are currently under quarantine,” it was said.
The young Oromo singer and songwriter, Haacaaluu Hundeessaa, was shot dead on Monday evening around 9:30 pm in a suburb of Addis Ababa, Gelan Condominiums, the Addis Ababa Police Commissioner Getu Argaw told state media. The singer was rushed to the hospital in critical condition but was pronounced dead a few hours later, it was said.
The news brought shock, with many Ethiopians mourning his death, and condemning the killing.
Words betray me! Read this 2017 profile of Haacaluu Hundeessa which recognizes his defiance, bold lyrics and courageous efforts to amplify the collective yearning for change in Ethiopia. A legend cut short. Rest in Power, dear Hacee! We'll never be forget. https://t.co/tswzjaJvC0
I am heartbroken to learn of the murder of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa in Addis Ababa today.
I interviewed Haacaaluu on April 19, 2019, and I was touched by his incredible warmth and kindness toward me. He showed me pictures of his daughters, and we laughed hard – that deep, strange laughter woven with pain – when he told me their names: Wobe (Guarantee) and Milke (Chance). He said that he gave them these names because he lives in the tension of love’s guarantee and life’s riskiness.
What follows are some excerpts from our interview. We had planned to do a follow-up interview in greater depth, but that is no longer possible. May God comfort his family, friends, and fans in their horrific pain.
As Haacaaluu told me, “We must be exemplars of kindness, forgiveness, and justice.”
AD: Who is Haacaaluu?
HH: I’m married with two daughters named Wobe (Guarantee) and Milke (Chance). I was born in 1976EC – I’m around 35. I had five brothers, but one recently died. I also have four sisters. I was arrested in 11th grade and spent five years in prison. When I got out, I started making music, because I wanted to tell my story.
Nine of the songs on my first album were written in prison. I did a performance in Sudan and quickly became a hero for my people. But the government tried to silence me. I was arrested and tortured in Maekelawi for a week. Because of government oppression, I had to make my second album in the United States. But I decided to return home to be with my people. I am willing to take risks and make sacrifices. I have faced assassination attempts.
AD: Is there a line in one of your songs written in prison that captures your message?
HH: Injustice cannot create justice. Two wrongs don’t make a right. A lot of my message focuses on Arat Kilo. Haile Selassie, the Derg, and the TPLF concentrated power there. The good things and injustice that Oromos have experienced originated from there. So I attack Arat Kilo in my music — not with physical violence — as the center of power.
My message is justice for all Ethiopians.
AD: What does justice mean?
HH: Justice and equality mean when all have their natural right to be themselves. Chinese have a natural right to be themselves. So do Americans. So do Oromos. Each person should have opportunity to exercise their natural rights.
AD: I have heard children say racist things against Oromos and other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. How can we overcome this?
This is deeply rooted in our society. It will be a long process. There is no quick fix. But saying we love Ethiopia but hate Ethiopian people doesn’t make sense. I do not hate Amharas or Tigrays. But I oppose the leaders that have created oppressive systems and structures for Oromo people.
We want to present a positive image of what it means to be Oromo that refutes the negative image of us as violent or a source of fear. We must be exemplars of kindness, forgiveness, and justice.
Andrew DeCort is an American scholar and researcher who lives and works in Ethiopia. He has served as a lecturer in ethics and theology at the Ethiopian Graduate School of Theology.He is also the founding director of Balinjeraye: The Neighbor-Love Movement, which inspires young Ethiopians to see others as neighbors across every boundary.
Six people were killed on Tuesday in Adama town when protests erupted a day after the popular Oromo singer was shot dead, reported BBC Amharic, citing said Dr. Mekonnen Feyissa, the medical director of Adama main hospital. Six people died on their way to the hospital and two died in intensive care, he was quoted as saying. “There are 75 casualties who came from Adama and around, most bullet injuries. There are also 19 people who came from the nearby Dera town, with burn injuries. They said their houses were set on fire,” Dr. Mekonnen told BBC Amharic.
Government buildings were set ablaze in the town, residents said.
In the town of Chiro, west Hararge, two people were shot and killed during protests there, medical staff at the hospital told BBC Amharic. At least four persons including an 8-year-old were killed by security forces in Negelle town of the Guji Zone during a protest earlier today, according to VOA.
Black smoke filled the air as protesters burned tyres to block main roads in the towns in the Oromia region on Tuesday. An equestrian statue of Ras Makonnen, Emperor Menelik’s nephew and the father of Haile Selassie, is demolished by demonstrators in Harar town. Ras Makonnen served as a general in the First Italo-Ethiopian War, playing a key role at the Battle of Adwa but he is seen by some Oromos as settlers generally referred to as neftegna (which translates as “rifleman” and often used as euphemisim for the Amharas.)
A group led by Jawar Mohammed prevented the body of the deceased musician to be transported to his hometown, says the Oromia’s police commissioner
The group also accused of killing an Oromia police officer who had been in the line of duty
The Ethiopian Federal police have confirmed that Jawar Mohammed of the Oromo Federalist Congress is in custody.
Federal police commissioner Endeshaw Tasew has appeared in state media on Tuesday evening to say that 35 people, including Jawar Mohammed, have been arrested. He said automatic weapons and walkie-talkies carried by the bodyguards of Jawar have also been seized. Accordingly, 8 firearms, 5 pistols, and nine walkie talkies have been seized from the bodyguards, he said.
Saying that “no one is above the law,” the Federal police commissioner demanded the public to cooperate with police while they are carrying out their tasks of law enforcement.
The Oromia’s police commissioner Ararsa Merdesa on his part said that the group led by Jawar Mohammed has prevented the body of the deceased musician Hachalu Hundessa to be transported to his hometown, Ambo, about 100 km west of Addis Ababa.
Large crowds surrounding a car carrying Haacaaluu’s body, walking to his home town of Ambo
While the coffin was on its way from St. Paul’s Hospital in Addis Ababa to Ambo town upon family’s request, the group stopped it at Burayu and brought it to Addis Ababa, the commissioner said.
In addition to that, the coffin was brought into the Oromia Prosperity Party headquarters situated in Addis Ababa’s Stadium area, according to the police commissioner. “Afterwards, they broke down the gates and entered the headquarters and killed an Oromia police officer who had been in the line of duty,” the police commissioner explained. Subsequently, with the help of security forces, the coffin was taken by helicopter to Ambo and the Oromia Police has arrested 35 people in connection with the deadly standoff, the commissioner said.
